The Twilight of Land-Use Controls: A Paradigm Shift? by Haar, Charles M.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 30 | Issue 4 Article 4
1996
The Twilight of Land-Use Controls: A Paradigm
Shift?
Charles M. Haar
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Land Use Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charles M. Haar, The Twilight of Land-Use Controls: A Paradigm Shift?, 30 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1011 (1996).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss4/4
THE TWILIGHT OF LAND-USE CONTROLS: A PARADIGM
SHIFT?
Charles M. Haar*
The subject chosen for this discussion- is both timely and
thought-provoking: the status and future of land-use regulations
in the United States. In the hope of making the issues sub-
sumed under this title as exciting to the general public as they
are to the practitioners, Professor Michael Allan Wolf has taken
the monumental Euclid' decision of the United States Supreme
Court in 1926 as the pivot of our deliberations. He has posed
the question most dramatically with overtones of a swelling
Wagnerian overture: "Is It The Twilight of Environmental and
Land-Use Regulation?"
That Euclid has arrived at the Biblical three-score-and-ten
milestone is truly an occasion for reflection on its achievements,
failures, and potentials. At a minimnum, it calls for a broad
review of history to furnish a context for the current debate
over land-use controls, as well as to decipher future trends.
Following Professor Wolf's cue, I will, in the hope of stirring
lively rejoinders, veer occasionally to post-Wagner-even
Mahlerian-extremes in my observations as to how the pendu-
lum of land-use social policy has swung, and where it ought to
rest at this particular time.
An Evolutionary Process
Change in land-use practices occurs at an uneven pace. The
distance of ne'arly a century makes it difficult to comprehend
today how radical and innovative was the first comprehensive
zoning ordinance adopted by New York City in 1916. A culmi-
nation of the efforts of diverse, often contending, interest groups
over many years, and shaped by the lively interchanges at the
* Chief Reporter, ALI, MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE, 1963-1966; Brandeis
Professor of Law, Harvard University.
1. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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annual National Conferences on City Planning, the first zoning
ordinances marked a revolutionary leap in the treatment of
individual property rights.2 Even more startling is an ensuing
reflection that all planning of land-uses must pass the test of
constitutional scrutiny and that the validation of the extensive
cutting into private property rights in Euclid' came during the
heart of the Lochner4 era of jurisprudence.5 The ultimate legit-
imacy of broad-ranging land-use controls, then, fell to the deter-
mination of a Supreme Court that thought little of outlawing
legislation for protecting the health of women as a violation of
their constitutional freedom to contract. How would interfering
with market expectations to the extent of a cut in property
values fare differently?
Nevertheless, a relative quiescence has prevailed since that
stormy period. What has persisted over the long history of land-
use controls since the 1920s is a continuation of the equilibrium
that the Euclid decision evoked. The 1916 New York City ordi-
nance, and its numerous progeny, was the culmination of an ex-
tensive state and local gestation and experimentation featuring
the division of urban land into districts within a municipality,
setting height, use, or bulk controls that differed among dis-
tricts, although treating similarly the land within each district.
The initial, tentative exercise of the police power, finally legiti-
mated by Justice Sutherland's opinion, guided (with but rare
modifications) central cities and satellite development through
World War II.
Slight variations on those common themes occurred in the
ensuing years. There was a pragmatic adjustment to facts-
changing or newly discovered-as well as to learning experienc-
es that required modification for legislation. Nevertheless, not
until 1961 was there a rewriting of the New York 1916 ordi-
nance. Few major revisions occurred elsewhere in the country.
2. See CHARLES M. HAAR AND MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, LAND-USE PLANNING 163-
66 (4th ed. 1989).
3. See Euclid, 272 U.S. 365 (reducing the value of plaintiffs land from $10,000
to $2500 per acre).
4. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (ruling that a New York law
regulating the hours of bakery workers violated a fundamental right to contract).




Differences in practical policy boiled down to a highly modest
minimum.
In addition, the state statutory framework remained frozen.
The model state enabling legislation sponsored by the United
States Department of Commerce in the 1920s continues domi-
nant in concept, organization, and tone to this date.6 Indeed,
again, one is struck by planning law's continuity and consisten-
cy in the enabling legislation field. Naturally, time would have
its way even here (a "quiet revolution" in the state enabling
laws occurred in the 1960s, some commentators allege),' with a
series of accretions and deletions. This seems unavoidable, for
land-use law deals with the dynamics and quickly changing
interactions in the modern world of demography, technology,
and economic development. But, predominantly, the system
remains fixed.
Even national land policies did not shake the smooth course.
Urban renewal, FHA insurance policies, model cities, housing
voucher programs, empowerment zones-each, in turn, came
under the land-use umbrella in the local theater. So, too, with
the revolution in metropolitan settlement patterns, that ex-
traordinary change in life styles that made the United States
the premier suburban nation; it was absorbed and assimilated
into the existing legal structure of land-use controls-service
industries, edge cities, mixed uses, environmental impact state-
ments, and large-scale developments. And, in interesting and
novel fashions, the recent sprout of managed growth philoso-
phies8 and the national environmental legislation reinforce,
indeed extend, the reach of the local regulatory power, yet do
not burst traditional bounds.
Two leitmotifs (of differing weight, it may be granted) then
emerge from this quick glance at history. One is the consistency
and gradualist approach in the system of local governmental
and administrative control over land-use: the separation of
6. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND-USE LAW 113 (2d ed. 1993).
7. See James H. Wickersham, Note, The Quiet Revolution Continues: The Emerg-
ing New Model for State Growth Management Studies, 18 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 489
(1994).
S. See Thomas G. Pelham, Adequate Public Facilities Requirements: Reflections on
Florida's Concurrency System for Managing Growth, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 973
(1992).
101319961
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:1011
land-use and building bulk areas, the zoning envelope, and the
districting cookie cutter, all in accordance with a comprehensive
plan. The zoning and planning commissions and boards of ap-
peals are all accepted today, as much as in 1916, as valid im-
plementations of the exercise of the sovereign police power over
private decision-makers.
The other trend is the continuity of self-criticism throughout
the period. While not exactly an orgy of introspection, the ex-
amination rises to a perpetual state of identity crises, perhaps
most sharply brought to a head in the controversial discussions
leading to the American Law Institute's Model Land Develop-
ment Code in the 1970s. What John Dewey called the social
search for certainty, in the land-use case can be translated as a
legal search for rationality; it meant argumentation over adap-
tation of the old systems of control to newly evolving forms of
life styles and urban designs, novel financing and mortgage
capital formations, new ways of land. development and entre-
preneurship. True, every once in a while important shifts in
emphasis occur. For example, state legislatures occasionally
assert themselves to require the inclusion of new elements in
the comprehensive plans drawn up by localities, or to enunciate
the preeminence of the more general welfare of the state (say,
in considering the future of construction abutting the Florida
Everglades) over the deployment of police power by localities
that concentrated too much on enhancing the local tax base. In
addition, at times, local councils amend the governing ordinance
to change lot-line and set-back techniques in order to accommo-
date the large-scale aspirations of corporate developers and
shopping center entrepreneurs. New philosophies of the city
planning profession contend with (and usually lose out to) ris-
ing expectations of private property entitlements; calls for
greater flexibility of government controls and the wider exercise
of discretion by agencies encounter the stolidity of certainty and
predictability.
In short, over an extended period of practice and of criticism,
land-use law in the different states and municipalities proceeds
on even course, between contending, but certainly not over-
whelming, waves of "too far" or "not far enough." Sometimes
emotions run high over amendments and variances or the foray
of a NIMBY (not in my back yard). Essentially, though, the
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stability of land-use controls is the striking factor-the system's
ability to adapt to startlingly new transportation technologies,
changes in financing and the flow of capital, even transforma-
tions of family values. Land-use controls continue to provide the
setting in which cities and suburbs exist today.
If in Rip van Winkle fashion, Bassett and Williams, and
certainly Bettman, came back to earth, they would soon be able
to resume comfortably their legal practice under current stat-
utes and ordinances. This paradox holds because zoning ex-
presses the classical liberal consensus so dominant in American
political life. It does not live in a world of absolutes. Zoning
avoids the extremes of laissez-faire or those of socialization of
land ownership, and even, despite Breitel's opinion in the New
York Court of Appeals decision in Penn Central,9 the intermedi-
ate position of a municipalization of development values.
The Current Challenge: The Reiterated Need for Periodic
Examination and Revision
The questions before the house are: have we reached a point
where, despite the accepted doctrine of "natura non facit
saltum" ("nature makes no leap"), a sharp break in the evolu-
tionary process is imminent; have we reached the end of the
land-use control system under which we have grown or en-
dured, perhaps even prevailed, for nearly a century?
The reality of the assault upon land-use laws (alluded to by
Professor Wolf) from so many sides is hard to evaluate, often
catching truths but pushing them to ideological distortions.
Partisans are replete with slogans and cliches, pitting, on the
one hand, the essentiality of private property in a democratic
community against the despoliation of the landscape by ruthless
exploiters. Nevertheless, do recent arguments against the cur-
rent system have merit? Is there something essential being
recognized here? Is the long period of stasis about to be punctu-
ated by a sharp break?
As a prelude, it should be noted that the existing land-use
legal system, sadly, does display soft underbellies that pose
9. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 1977),
affd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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appropriate targets for invasion: questions aroused by sloppy
draftsmanship; ordinances that are unclear in definition and
ambiguous in defining responsibilities; and troubles deciphering
the general intent of the enactor. Without much difficulty, one
can point out vague declarations of principles in the city plan-
ning documents. Confusion is often encountered in the alloca-
tion of powers among zoning commissions, planning boards,
landscape and design commissions, and the local legislatures.
Even on the federalist level, the proper division among the
national, state, regional, and local levels is continuously shifting
and unclear.
More than sprucing up language or clarifying ambiguities
spurs the current challenges. Strangely, and ironically, the local
land-use control instrumentalities are under fire as a result of
at least two pressures emanating from the national level.
One pressure is the emerging property entitlement emphasis.
A recent series of Supreme Court opinions, Lucas,"0 Nollan,"
and Dolan,' have propelled the Fifth Amendment of the Con-
stitution to center stage. The opinions of Justice Antonin Scalia
especially seek to employ the compensation knife to cut through
government efforts to set a non-market framework for public
and private development or, on the expansive side, to upset a
community determination of the appropriate physical setting for
urban and suburban existence. Issues involving property "tak-
ings" are prominent in the conservative agenda. Congress and
various state legislatures seem to be following through with
property rights bills, with varying diminutions in value requir-
ing the balm of full compensation for property restrictions
caused by environmental and land-use controls. The ultimate
effect of reification of the bundle of property rights, but for the
nuisance exception, is a chilling of planning innovations.
A second pressure arousing unease among adherents of the
current system is a looming retreat by courts from the scope of
lenient judicial review that has been the accepted standard
since Euclid.13 The benevolent standard of reasonableness-a
10. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
11. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
12. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
13. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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minimum threshold that is easily passed over b~y most land-use
regulations-may be ending. Indeed, footnote three of Nollan'4
may someday be noted as the first shot of the counter-revolu-
tion.
Even more significant is the message generally read into the
1994 elections. Until the most recent Gingrich shifts, the Re-
publican triumph seemed to herald a return to a golden age of
individualism and Darwinian energy, marked, above all, by a
revulsion against government intervention in the market. The
national priorities were redefined by a shrink-the-Government
approach; the cry for deregulation reverberated down to the
bureaucratic machinery of local land-use controls. By no means
are local administration and taxation-grass roots and close to
the people though they may be-immune from the onslaught on
the governmental presence. Legitimate targets are many: prolif-
eration of state and local permitting requirements; contradictory
overlap of national environmental dictates with the ordinary
zoning and subdivision controls; and sharp increases in property
taxation. These targets generate resentment and calls for re-
form.
The significance of what may be added as a third contribut-
ing factor to the revisionary attitude is harder to appraise. That
is the scribbling-in Keynes's colorful phrase-of academics.
Law reviews and planning journals abound with skillfully pre-
pared systems of alternative land-use controls. Composed at a
high level of abstraction characteristic of contemporary political
theory, the alternative land-use systems present an attractive
possibility of bright new worlds of land-use controls against
which the current system pales.
Reactions and proposals range across the spectrum. Anecdotal
instances of incompetence and corruption abound. Some would
revise still within the existing control framework. Occasionally,
however, the public uproar swells to advocacy of a paradigm
shift. 6
The most striking of the various contenders are those who
14. 483 U.S. 825, 836 n.3 (1987) (stating, in part, "[wie have required that the
regulation 'substantially advance' the 'legitimate state interest' sought to be
achieved.")
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would go so far as to repeal all land-use controls. Houston,
Texas is their great example of a city devoid of land-use con-
trols. However, one caveat sneaks in: advocates of a total re-
turn to the operations of the private market would retain only
one curb: the common law of nuisance. But that is all. All we
need, according to this proposal, is sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas ("so use your own property in such a manner as not to
injure that of another"). The good old common law will get us
the most efficient, even the wisest, allocation of land-uses in
our metropolitan areas.
To grasp the nature of the calls for change, and to locate and
guide future policy, it is helpful to probe a bit into their philo-
sophical underpinnings, as well as to once again set them
against the basic tenets of the existing system.
The American Political Culture
Digging below the surface in order to understand the remark-
able persistence of zoning, subdivision, and other land-use con-
trols, one conclusion emerges surprisingly and starkly: land-use
controls in the United States are truly representative of Ameri-
can culture, and fit tightly into the classical liberal tradition so
prevalent in our political thinking at large.
The land-use control system especially encompasses the as-
sumption of individual sovereignty: as possessive beings, people
best express themselves through the operation of the unfettered
market. The land-use control system in the United States
stands on a base of a remarkably unified cultural and political
tradition. The Lockean view of inherent rights dominates.
Where government does take the step of correcting perceived
evils, or to provide some guidance for land development, there
is little room for divergence over the extent of appropriate gov-
ernent intervention: as little as possible. Conflict is muted;
the area of disagreement occurs only within an accepted middle
range of possibilities.
Thus, as stressed in other aspects of United States historical
development by Louis Hartz and Richard Hofstadter-with
different degrees of certitude-the legal culture draws heavily
on the individualistic society of eighteenth-century liberal En-
lightenment theory. The predominant philosophy of land-use
reflects the overall societal emphasis of the hedonistic pursuit
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of material well-being. The aim is not to promote any particular
societal ends; rather, the framework of authority entitles citi-
zens to pursue their own ends, albeit consistent with similar
liberty for all. Thus, the dominant ideology toward land is that
of freedom to act on the land one "owns," a compound of ele-
ments of self-help, free enterprise, competition, and beneficent
cupidity. Uses, even when it comes to government control under
the zoning ordinance, are permitted as of right.
In the instance of land-uses, however, there is a crucial vari-
ant on the overall theme that makes matters more complicated.
While the right to develop, use, exclude, and dispose of one's
land is the dominant view (pace Blackstone, own up to Heaven
and down to Hell), contrary philosophic strands emerge as the
density of populations and activities multiply. The peculiar
nature of land in the metropolitan area puts it outside the
ordinary workings of the economic market of supply and de-
mand. The resource of metropolitan land is interdependent in
its parcels, unique in its locational aspects, and vulnerable in
value to the actions of neighbors, even of competing uses fur-
ther away in space. Private dealings in land cause social
externalities. Inescapably, land forms the territorial base for
community. Consequently, goals of public interest can be seen
to override individual claims. Swathes of suburban society natu-
rally look to the planning and zoning acts for protection and
patronage as counterweights to individual dominion. Therefore,
when land-use controls become the center of attention, it is
easier to argue that while rights attach to the individual, to the
ownership of property, and to its development, they are subject,
at a minimum, to the equal rights of other owners. The func-
tional law of property always balances protection of private
advantage with both the enjoyment of other land owners and
with contemporary community goals. Even Hobbes included
"place to live in" with the other retained rights of self-defense,
water, and air, when the social contract was signed.
Furthermore, there are broader goals of society that are too
extensive to be undertaken by individuals or that are embodied
in broader contexts of the public welfare. While zoning remains
predominantly individualistic, it bears the Aristotelian idea that
justice is found in shared undertaking both for the good of
individuals and the good of the community. The free-rider prob-
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lem and the social paradoxes, sharply manifest in metropolitan
land, limit the area for the exercise of unbridled individualism.
Indeed, in the development of metropolitan land, so many
unresolved and contradictory aspirations accumulate within the
two poles of individualism and community that one can con-
clude of zoning that it is typically American in the sense that it
represents no one coherent theoretical view. The typical zoning
ordinance is a quintessential product of a series of pragmatic
compromises; it finds working arrangements in situations where
people disagree over particular choices; it emerges with a mini-
mal modus vivendi for a pluralist undertaking. In sum, there is
no overall framework of priorities. Like American society, zon-
ing is profoundly middle-class and liberal in basic orientation
toward rights and deeply Lockean in character. On the other
hand, it seeks to absorb contending viewpoints of the existence
of a public interest without shaking the core belief system.
Consequently, land-use controls embody on a local scale, and in
a physical sense, the national ambivalence and ambiguity. In
addition, by not bringing conflicts out in the open, but seeming-
ly adopting all views at one and the same time, the ordinances
are again typically American in the desire not to highlight
conflict or probe the darker side.
Hence, the appeal of zoning (as well as the reason for recent
attacks upon it from those who resent the lack of dominance of
their credo) lies in surface reconciling rather than repressing
competing conceptions of the good life and rival notions of
society's claims upon the individual property owner. The popu-
larity of zoning lies in its melting pot quality: while it embodies
the strand of local democracy and political and legal, if not eco-
nomic, equality, its most powerful attachment is to a free mar-
ket operated on by individual liberties. But, at the same time,
the public interest of a larger society asserts itself. The con-
straints that judicial interpretations of equality place on the
democratic expression of local wills put the management of the
resulting tensions at the heart of post-modem controls. Occa-
sionally, the uneasy and imperfect coexistence of the three goals
is out in the open; from time to time, the honeymoon of the
three strands turns into a tense cohabitation.
Zoning, with all its ambivalences, is but a special phase of
the shared understanding that permeates the society. It is froz-
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en at the center of the political and ideological continuum, the
unhappy inevitable compromise, and subject to continuous new
compromises by the widespread use of variances and special
exceptions. Zoning would prefer to conceal the sour notes spo-
radically emitted from the outburst of conflicts. Liberty, equali-
ty, and property can conceivably be worked out as philosophical
abstracts & la John Rawls. But the implementation, the balanc-
ing, of these noble concepts in a specific context, such as the
siting of a regional shopping center, is where difficulties bubble
to the surface, not to overlook the embarrassment of the pa-
pered-over internal incoherences.
Some Specific Examples
How different visions of the good society are jammed into
legislation governing the uses of land, without too much striv-
ing at consistency, synthesis, restructuring, or making a delib-
erate choice, can be seen on the legislative level again and
again. It is but a slight exaggeration, when it comes to the run-
of-the-mill zoning ordinances, to apply the tag of a collage of
contradictory convictions, along with unavoidable reconciliations
when contradictions become too blatant. The following are a few
prevalent examples of unifying compromise, carrying with them
the underlying axiom of a continued dominance of the private
sector, but slowed or modified by social restraints.
1. Height and bulk restrictions set by the zoning envelope
obviously do cut into the private decision-maker's freedom. In
the 1990s, one cannot build another Equitable Building in the
Wall Street area of New York, concentrating 13,000 people in
one block (plus casting a shadow on Trinity Church, a too sym-
bolic dominance, perhaps, of the new money religion over the
old). Under the zoning ordinance, skyscrapers will not be al-
lowed to blot out the sky completely, yet corporations can build
towering IBM and AT&T headquarters cheek-by-jowl on Madi-
son Avenue. Profitable high rises are not extinct-although they
cannot loom too high on the skyline.
2. Zoning shapes the size and character of the community, but
not too extensively. Property values are to be respected and
stabilized as far as possible. Ramapo 5 in the East, and
15. See Golden v. Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972), appeal dismissed,
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Petaluma 6 on the opposite coast, with their growth plans, can
limit the number of building permits they will issue, and force
private development along lines of existing public infrastruc-
ture. Yet the timing-based restraint must be reasonable, the
period limited in years, and self building of infrastructure al-
lowed. Overall, any growth-system control must be slow-paced.
Ratification of the market is even stronger in built-up areas
and cities. Indeed, under the 1916 density controls (should one
put quotation marks around controls?), New York City could
still end up with a population of fifty-five million. One can
argue that this is not a bite on property rights of significant
magnitude.
3. Dramatic changes in traditional Euclidean districting that
incorporate the design flexibility advocated by professional city
planners occurred in the 1960s and 1970s. Ensconced within
them are continued compromises. The arrival of planned unit
developments, floating zones, development rights transfer, 7
and cluster zoning can be cited as counterexamples of my thesis
of slow-paced and evolutionary change in land-use controls. And
they do present important modification of the traditional sys-
tem. But always the restraining hand: the Chesterfield Town-
ship court, in invalidating a sweeping flexible ordinance, termed
it "the antithesis of zoning."18
The new techniques widen the range of the operation of indi-
vidual liberty, with the size of the physical tract making feasi-
ble new land development arrangements. Novel as it may be,
this changing methodology can be seen as a natural outflow
from past permissions for employing performance standards, 9
409 U.S. 1003 (1972); John D. Landis, Do Growth Controls Work? A New Assessment,
58 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 489 (1992).
16. See Construction Indus. Ass'n. v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
17. See CHARLES M. HAAR ET AL., TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS: A PRIMER
(1980); John J. Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE
L.J. 75 (1973). The New York Court identified four major purposes served by TDRs:
landmark preservation; open space; economic development; and general land manage-
ment. See Penn Central Trans. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (1977) (N.Y.
1971), affd, 438 U.S. 104.
18. Rockhill v. Chesterfield Township, 128 A.2d 473, 479 (N.J. 1957).




larger acreage districts, and growing tolerance for compatible,
although different, uses. And, above all, as a group, these inno-
vations elaborate the property rights of large-scale developers
who internalize the external impacts within the larger land
area and punch out an enclave of mixed uses that, meeting
publicly enunciated standards, can be free from the design re-
straints imposed on small parcels. It can be argued that they
are an implementation of new social needs for group efficiency,
enhanced tax revenue, and evolving social aesthetic preferences.
4. Localism is rampant, attachment to grass roots and close-
ness to neighborhoods is the chosen course in the United States
for exercise of the restrictive land-use power. ° Local preemi-
nence flows from the classical notion of limited and decentral-
ized power. Increasingly, however, evolutionary change may
increase its hold, as this tenet becomes subject to review by
state courts and by state legislative mandates to take local
spillovers and externalities into account.
This raises a sharp conflict in the system. Implementation of
housing and land policies is clustered at the local level. Over
the long-run, however, metropolitan solutions (whether by re-
gional agencies or by state governments) seem to be the only
ways to solve pressing environmental, social, and economic
problems. The metropolitan economy hinges upon a metropoli-
tan system of land-uses; solutions to local problems often do
require a regional approach to population distribution, location
of employment, affordable housing, and environmental preserva-
tion. While in the past there has been a refusal to give up the
local exercise (and local accountability) of power, the needs of
interglobal corporations may merge with advocates of efficient
government to force a revision of the local boundary curb on
land-use controls.
More precisely, as several state courts are gingerly advo-
cating, suburbs need to shoulder low-income housing responsi-
bilities; and, as part of regional land policies and regional eco-
nomic development, pay for the fair share of the costs derived
from the benefits of their siting within the metropolitan area.
Most dramatically, the general welfare attack on exclusionary
20. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Govern-
ment Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1990).
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zoning by the Mount Laurel"' cases may foster a new attitude
toward class and race relations. Land needs to be made
available at prices that are affordable for moderate and low-
income housing. Calls for equality will intrude on democracy
and individualism.22
5. The countervailing force of neighborhood groups and partic-
ipatory democracy-forces uniquely at play in the land-use
control area-can subvert the purported supremacy of local
legislative sovereignty. From the outset, the Standard Zoning
Enabling Act provided that no regulation would become effec-
tive until after a public hearing, at which parties in interest
and citizens should have an opportunity to be heard.23 Espe-
cially with NIMBYs and affordable housing, can subgroupsl
apply pressures for excluding unwanted uses or for expansion of
desirable facilities. Citizen associations are quite powerful. The
introduction of mandated citizen review boards is a way of
controlling bureaucratic power, but it legitimizes conflicting
pulls that will shatter temporary equilibria, often to replace
them with assertions of private property rights.
6. Segregation of uses-the essence of zoning-has dark over-
tones in certain contexts, such as the segregation of users,
rather than uses. As early as 1917, overly blatant divisions
were outlawed by the courts. But more sophisticated and indi-
rect controls, such as minimum acreages or overzoning industri-
al land, have escaped the judicial lens. Too often the public
power has been deployed to divide communities in ways anti-
thetical to the American Dream. Gated suburbs, surrounded by
legal walls of exclusionary zoning, are a blot on the domestic
scene. In many suburban areas, the equality norm is slowly
arising to combat the democratic view of majoritarianism--espe-
cially where the tyranny of localist domination feared by
21. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel
(Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983); Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel 1), 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.), appeal dismissed
and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
22. See generally CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE AND
AUDACIOUS JUDGES (1996).




Madison's Federalist Paper #10 prevents the entry of competing
ideas and competing political blocs.
Ironically, the conservative District Court that originally held
the Euclid village ordinance invalid, used as its rationale the
potential discriminatory impacts of zoning along race and class
lines.24 Realization of the inadvertent consequences of many
aspects of zoning is now filtering into many liberal views. The
fascinating point-counterpoint of court and legislature in the
twenty-five-year Mount Laurel litigation shows the overwhelm-
ing impact of a written constitution and the equal protection
norm on other philosophies of controls.25 But it should also be
noted that the New Jersey court can be said to be in the
mainstream of property rights-this time in enabling the build-
ers and the landowners from whom they obtain options to oper-
ate in a market, now freed from the artificial government re-
straints imposed by local exclusionary regulations.
This difficult and troubling aspect of land-use controls needs
a resolution that may prove wrenching to the traditional dele-
gation of land-use powers to the small units of government;
avoiding the serious social strains by an agreement to tiptoe
around race and class issues is a fantasy-and the movement
for environmental justice 6 is but the latest push toward great-
er openness over submerged misuses of land-use powers. Only
with the rejection of social fatalism embedded in the notion of
unchangeable human nature can the circle of social conflict and
reinforced fear be minimized in the environmental and land-use
area.
7. The overriding of individual property owners through the
exercise of the compulsory acquisition power may seem a contra-
diction of the theme of Lockean prevalence. Yet the justification
for the modern extensive broadening of the public use doctrine,
and the most difficult arena for repealing contrary precedent, is
recycling by another private developer of property taken from a
24. "In the last analysis the result to be accomplished is to classify the popula-
tion and segregate them according to their income or situation in life." Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev'd, 272 U.S. 365
(1926).
25. See generally HAAR, supra note 22.
26. See e.g., Vicki Been, Analyzing Evidence of Environmental Justice, 11 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 1 (1995).
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private owner. Facing the quandary of upholding a taking of
land by an authority that would then turn it over not to anoth-
er public agency, but to a private owner, Justice Douglas, in
Berman v. Parker,27 had to content us with a legal fiction, one
that refused to look beyond the iron curtain of the taking and
so could disregard the ultimate disposition and resting place of
the land. Again, the various federal and state urban redevelop-
ment legislations, and the ensuing variants of judicial justifica-
tions for broad exercises of the eminent domain power, even
with the payment of just compensation, can be argued to be
indirect ways of extending the individual sovereign powers of
selected private sector developers. Only where the private mar-
ket has failed, or there are insuperable barriers, such as the
holdout, will the public use justification for the taking of one
property owner's land for disposition to another private person
be invoked.
8. The nature of the local comprehensive plan that enunciates
future land policies and sets out the vision that is to guide the
implementing regulations in practice too often turns into an
American compromise. From the outset, the draftsmen of the
Standard Planning Enabling Act have been divided on the ex-
tent and type of private development that should fall within the
ambit of the plan. The debate concerns whether public planning
should go beyond the spatial. The diametrically opposite ver-
sions of Bettman (planning entails social and economic factors)
and of Basset (land-use planning relates to physical aspects
alone) appear with equal force in the same standard planning
statute, coexisting in an incredible contradiction. This ambiguity
persists throughout the enactment of state enabling statutes.
Huge investments are required to produce the dwelling units
and the infrastructures-another name for the economists' "pub-
lic goods"--that turn a series of individual homes into a
neighborhood. This concentrates attention on the physical as-
pects of development. Since externalities are more obvious,
government intervention also seems safer with respect to ac-
cepted tenets than does broad-scale planning. Perhaps, also,
competence on the part of administrative agencies is more prev-
alent in design components. When the need for a powerful
27. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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emotional impetus to budge any rigidities of a social system is
added to these considerations, it becomes clear why emphasiz-
ing the physical setting of land-use controls becomes so appeal-
ing. Clearance of physical blight, with its call for the eradica-
tion of dilapidated housing and slums, arouses a middle-class
constituency. This is also more likely to receive the approval of
reviewing courts as being indeed a constitutional public use.
Furthermore, it means that the subtleties, contradictions, and
intractabilities of human nature do not have to be taken into
account by blunt government action. How else can one explain
the apparent naivete of the belief, held by many of the origina-
tors of urban renewal, that by tearing down deteriorating struc-
tures, they would transform people's lives; and that somehow,
by blotting out the visible physical evil and substituting new
forms of concrete structures, urban life would be enhanced?
Fortunately, awareness of the economic, social, and even racial
consequences of physical siting and location is emerging in
public opinion polls; however, ambivalence still persists as to
how wide the community may cast its net.'
With the introduction of the Standard Planning Enabling Act,
and its later variants in the states, individual ownership of
land is defined by the communal attachments and the public
policies that form the consensus conclusions of the comprehen-
sive plan. Externalities and the free-rider problem make the
land market inefficient, or, rather, inequitable (or both). For
example, the private market-by a sheer profit calculus-will
not provide inexpensive land for affordable housing, nor will the
costs of pollution be borne by the sinning enterprise, whose
fiduciary obligation remains predominantly to its shareholders.
Unlike unregenerate classic liberalism, zoning can assert, as
a basic principle, that it is in the order of the social arrange-
ment that individual rights are sacrificed for the sake of the
general good, so long as there is equality of treatment, and a
nexus between the restriction and the goals of a well-considered
plan. Like the standard corporate plan, it is necessary to set
forth goals, priorities, and the allocation of resources, but un-
28. Contrast the opinion of Chief Justice Wilentz in Mt. Laurel II with that of
the Virginia Supreme Court in Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enter., 198 S.E.2d
600 (Va. 1973) (striking down inclusionary zoning ordinances).
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like a Board of Director's business plan, there are many indi-
vidual voices over and above the broad cleavage between pri-
vate and public.
So, at best, only the most generalized objectives and priori-
ties are enunciated in the commonly adopted master plan. At
the same time, one should note that the "in accordance with a
comprehensive plan" requirement of the Standard Zoning En-
abling Act may be used by individual property owners to com-
bat restrictions on their land.
9. The efficiency of the Adam Smith market has yielded on
other occasions in consideration of land-use problems. Urban
land's monopolistic nature makes the need for a safety net more
obvious. The admission is widespread that the ruthless market
needs to be tempered by the needs of disadvantaged groups.
This can be achieved through techniques such as inclusionary
zoning, development exaction fees, linkages, and low-income
housing density bonuses. The general belief in economic growth
is modified in these cases to protect those who otherwise suffer
from change. Contempt for the economically disadvantaged and
politically disenfranchised characteristic of a social Darwinism
in other areas of economic activity is tempered in the land-use
area. Consequently, the controls are often shaped, and even
initiated, by this realization, and they further justify extending
actions by governments.
Part and Parcel of the System
All of these examples illustrate that zoning, as an outcrop
and interpretation of American political thought and culture, is
nowhere near a substitution of a collectivist ethos for individual
decision-making over land. Nor is it Friedrich A. von Hayek un-
leashed. The ambiguities and ambivalences involved make zon-
ing as American as apple pie. By denying, or simply assuming,
it buries epic conflicts. It is as if no conflicts exist between
tenants and owners, between old residents and newcomers, or
between welcomers of change and keepers of the familiar.
Above all, zoning fails to recognize that heavy issues divide the
have-nots and the haves.
So the system of land-use controls-blown-up targets of the
current attacks against the presence of governments-turns out
to be a shifting stew. It is a mix of conflicting elements strug-
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gling for philosophic dominance, embodying forms of compro-
mise, and, above all, a concoction lacking the spice of direct,
self-confident assureties. Zoning is an effort to mediate opposing
conceptions of the good. Within this typical American approach,
zoning neither clearly establishes liberal values, nor espouses
communitarian values.
Nor have land-use controls come to a final resting point con-
cerning the deference to be paid to popular democracy. Zoning
is the Mozart of adjustment. No institution does it better. It
establishes a shifting balance that is temporary in nature, but
at the same time a fixed balance. The theory of the untram-
melled market seems dominant, but having let the genie of
public interest out of the bottle, it cannot be shoved back in no
matter how impassioned the later efforts. The difficulty of de-
fining the very terms of individual applications themselves
("ownership" and "community" are overwhelmingly barnacled
with layers of meaning), coupled with the complexity of line-
drawing, is the drafting lesson of zoning. These difficulties are
also the reason for the frustrations accompanying zoning, some-
times to the point of advocating its expungement and repeal.29
But this very source of anxiety is also the reason for zoning's
popularity and acceptance. Despite the criticism by certain
academics, lawyers for property owners, and sectors of public
opinion, existing land-use controls do not buck market trends
too severely, nor do they impose a collectivist view on land
development. Above all, they are not tools for redistribution of
resources from the rich to the poor.
Indeed, the inconsistencies and ambivalences related to zon-
ing and other land-use ordinances can be attributed to contra-
dictions in American society itself. And the magnet for attack,
most especially the barbs from the dominant class of the legal
profession (for example, the failure of regulations to be unified,
consistent, or logical), arises from the strange juxtaposition that
zoning is a mirror image of society." And the response of
29. In his regulatory-taking project, Justice Scalia seems on the verge of being
the major advocate for this course. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
30. One could argue that an important aspect of American public life today-a
deep and growing cynicism about the political system-also explains why the zoning
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practitioners within the current system involves attempts to
impose a semblance of order on top of the disorder of land
development reality. The lack of predictability makes this an
onerous task. The interdependence of land, even though parcels
and tracts are individually owned, makes a return to the state
of nature a frightening Hobbesian prospect. The system may
not be coherent, but plausibility suffices. And the delicate bal-
ance of the landowner's rights with the perceived needs of the
society-at-large moves only within slight degrees. A new para-
digm would not be welcomed by any of the parties.
The Positive Side: Enter the Joint Venture
One evolutionary trend may ultimately bring about sharp
changes. This trend is widening the scope of controls by empha-
sizing the "welfare" term of the police power quartet. In the
marketplace of ideas, zoning can be justified as expunging im-
perfections in the market, rather than replacing it wholesale or
interfering with its operations. The real estate market is tradi-
tionally an inefficient one-primarily local, characterized by
imperfect knowledge of supply and pricing, and dominated by
lack of data or awareness of national trends. Hence there is a
need for legislative enactment to rectify these shortcomings, but
one that still owes allegiance to the untrammelled theory of the
market. My guess is that, though far short of a revolutionary
break such as repeal, society is ready to move the equilibrium
further than in the past, most particularly against the prevail-
ing legal constraint of a separation between the public and
private worlds.
Recognition of affirmative potentials may provide the more
likely impetus for rewriting the current agenda. It is the posi-
tive side, the potential of land-use planning and ordinances
operating in conjunction with the Lockean owner, by way of
enhancement and of synergies, that may differentiate newly
emerging land-use controls from the compromises of the past.
Consequently, the chosen stopping places of the present system
of land-use controls may be dislodged. The future may witness
the retreat of the liberal constitutional rights of the Lockean
system has lost some of its intellectual purchase.
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order, while still extolling self-interest, revised to satisfy the
exigencies of the joint-venture society.
By appropriating a theme that worked in pushing zoning
through the conservative barrier of the 1926 Supreme Court,
the joint venture of public and private may be depicted as a
mean between the extremes of total and no control. While the
mental image of development held by the new control pattern is
no longer the unencumbered self, the community aspects of the
joint venture are also shaded down.
The new combination does not, by any means, represent a
subordination of private interest to public interest, as
Benthamite utilitarianism might require. Rights remain trumps,
but in accordance with the terms of a partnership agreement in
whose drafting both sides are deeply involved. Power does shift
away from democratic institutions such as local legislatures,
and towards a combine of individual (and group, as in Mount
Laurel) entitlements established by the plan. That this new
form of land organization may represent the dominance of
large-scale developers and corporations (as seems to be the case
of the General Motors-City of Detroit combine in the
Poletown3 ' case) simply brings out into the open what has al-
ways been latent in past planning compromises. But visibility
can summon controls.
It is too early to say whether the joint-venture approach is
for better or worse. The marriage of market and regulatory
strategies rests on different but complementary conceptions:
business as the motor force in our capitalist economy and the
developer of metropolitan land; and government as public con-
science, minor market manipulator, and, in areas where the
profit motive cannot work, the purveyor of funds or the initiator
of programs. The traditional attachment to private enter-
prise-and the force of its constituent lobbies-leads not to com-
plete substitution of public goals for those of the private deci-
sion-maker, but rather to the stimulation of joint participations.
Through the accretion of experience of the past thirty years,
the joint-venture form is becoming a familiar phenomenon. In
31. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich.
1981).
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one sense, it is the distillation and condensation of much that
has gone on before. One may argue that we have already ar-
rived at a half-way house to the joint venture in many land-use
ordinances. Increased use of performance standards, rather
than preordained prescribed regulations, leads to the private
sector choosing the means by which it will arrive at goals set
by community participation. Casting of local land-use controls
in the form of incentives and subsidies, rather than command-
and-control exhortations, also moves to a sharing of responsibil-
ities.
At its most complex, the joint-venture format has come to
mean cooperation among three significant groups: private devel-
opers and lenders, local municipal and state governments, and
relevant federal agencies. Ideally, bargains struck among them
can result in coexistence of private profits and public benefits.
It should be noted that gains would be made in each sector
that could not be obtainable through individual efforts alone. As
experience has introduced the reality principle, the approach
explicitly encourages participants to pursue their own ends as
they best envision them-a reinterpretation of self-interested
maximization that is the settled norm in the society-redeemed
by the belief that a framework of properly designed programs,
through a coordination process, will produce benefits for every-
one.
At the optimum operation of the system, each sector is as-
signed to do what it does best. Ultimate success will depend on
the ability to reach across ideological differences in order to
have a rational dialogue about hugely important issues. In
theory (and sometimes in practice), the government applies its
broad perspective of public needs to the design of responsive
policies. In many ways, often unrecognized, the government is
uniquely situated, especially in the exercise of its sovereign
powers of regulation, eminent domain, tax abatements, and
awareness of local conditions. The private sector meets its joint-
venture partner with different but equally important strengths.
Driven by entrepreneurial instincts, business combines knowl-
edge of investment opportunities and capital markets, and as-
sessment of consumer wants with its drive for cost reduction
and efficiency. Micro-awareness of the private sector comple-
ments the macro policies of the public sector.
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Cultural change would have to accompany, indeed precede,
legal change. A prerequisite for success of a joint venture pro-
gram is overcoming business disdain of government and govern-
ment distrust of business. Moreover, the time has come for
modifying the corrosive pessimism over local government will
and capacities.
A principal task for government is to win over the average
developer by eliminating genuine fear of administrative bureau-
cracy, red tape, delays, and perceived inefficiency-especially
when actions of several levels of government are required. The
public sector can take two major steps to encourage the joint-
venture approach: (1) streamlining local land-use controls and
federal regulatory procedures, and (2) developing a cohesive
institutional strategy in its comprehensive plan formulation.
Realignment and coordination among city and federal depart-
ments that influence land development, coupled with a simpli-
fied application and approval procedure, could increase private
support, understanding, and participation.
At the same time, the private sector must work to gain the
trust of a government wary of its continuous pushing of the
zoning envelope, overexploitation of infrastructure, red-lining
practices, poor management, and undertones of ethnic or racial
discrimination. Developers need to understand, and work to
achieve, the social goals of a project while keeping their eye on
the bottom line. This may require prodding. Voluntary, coopera-
tive solutions are difficult to maintain. While some corporations
may be considering environmental values in making pollution
decisions, they do so, at least in part, because of laws and sanc-
tions regulating pollution.
The role of organized power concentrations (who can thrive
under either a system of land-use regulation or one of non-regu-
lation) will determine the success of the joint venture. Stressing
joint ventures may be too outright an acknowledgment that
"the business of America is business." Joint ventures may prove
to be too cozy an alignment, and when the music stops the
protected groups keep the chairs. But this recognition provides
greater negotiation power for the public share of total return.
Finally, the need at strategic moments for direct government
intervention and decision-making for human settlements grows
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more clearly recognized, even by a Lockean private-property
oriented society. The imperfections of the private land market,
set forth glaringly by the absence of affordable housing, are all
too obvious in the metropolitan area. Thus, one should keep in
mind the use of urban development corporations, or metropoli-
tan land-bank associations equipped with eminent domain pow-
ers to compulsorily acquire land, and authority to either (1)
package large-scale, mixed-use land developments for private in-
vestments, or (2) actually carry entire projects themselves. They
may be the next evolutionary phase of controls. Ultimately, the
joint-venture organization of metropolitan land development
challenges the capacity and willingness of a society to engage in
deliberate social change.
Where public tax funds or exercises of sovereign powers en-
hance land value, recapture by society of some proportion of
values generated by its efforts should be acknowledged. This
will also be the test of the new forms of joint-venture controls.
If planning and land-use controls cannot prove that they pay
for themselves either by compensating those property owners
who have to undergo the costs of use restrictions, or by making
an economic return on infrastructure investments or joint ven-
tures, then there is little reason for them to put forth claims in
a world of limited resources. Hence, public efficiency has to be
added to distributive goals if communitarian values are to play
a stronger role in the post-Lockean society of the joint venture.
Conclusion
Another version of the question posed by this seminar is to
study the goals put forth for the passage of land-use controls
and the extent of their actualization. What are the purposes of
planning and zoning law? Is repeal warranted today? And for
the future, drawing on the historic trends, is a sharp break in
the offing or will zoning undertake yet another pragmatic adap-
tation of the liberal tradition?
Zoning in the United States, while remaining surprisingly
stable, has displayed considerable flexibility, adapting to chang-
ing conditions of urban expansion and development innovations.
Throughout its history, it has remained within the admittedly
loose confines of the framework spelled out by the two Stan-
dard Enabling Acts. And it is most likely to continue in this
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fashion by way of occasional incremental modifications, repre-
senting a limited renewing of the vitality of the original concep-
tions. For the repeal of zoning 2 and other land-use controls,
advocated by some groups,33 does not posit a coherent, intel-
lectually serious alternative.34 Such a revolutionary change is
not in the cards; its lure is but an abstract will-o-the-wisp; per-
haps, like the Holmes characterization of the nuisance doctrine
as a "benevolent yearning," the same can be said of the support
for revolution as a substitute vision for current controls. 5 Ur-
ban life is no longer "comparatively simple."36 Common needs
and interests of users and enjoyers of land enlist a wide recog-
nition of vulnerability, interdependency, and the need for a
generalized coordination. A complex, mobile, and pluralistic
society demands various forms of guidance and, at times, ex-
plicit direction over the purposes for which metropolitan land is
used.
Public action, in the form of land-use controls, is unavoidable
in the provision of infrastructure generated by existing and pro-
posed transportation and utilities systems, 7 the availability
and affordability of housing, the revitalization of central cit-
ies, 8 and the coping with emerging regional environmental
needs. Again, large-scale undertakings are too intimidating to
the private sector without subsidies, incentives, or guarantees.
This also means prevention of potential conflicts in land-uses
(when the nuisance equitable anticipatory injunction is not
available). Only through the action of the community can the
32. For instance, President Reagan's Commission on Housing recommended recon-
sideration of Euclid. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON HOUS., THE REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COMISSION ON HOUSING 202 (1982).
33. That one-man army, Richard Epstein, has even argued that zoning is uncon-
stitutional. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
E M NENT Do1AIN 131-34 (1985).
34. There are exceptions, of course. See the argument for an alternative free-en-
terprise system in Douglas W. Kmiec, Deregulating Land-use, 130 U. OF PA. L. REV.
30 (1981).
35. Cf. THoAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION (1962).
36. See CHARLES M. HAAR AND LANCE LIEBMAN, PROPERTY AND LAW 1093 (2d ed.
1985) (citing Euclid).
37. The Boston Harbor litigation and its outcome exemplify consequences beyond
the reach of traditional nuisance law or of private initiatives. See generally Charles
M. Haar, Boston Harbor: A Case Study, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 641 (1992).
38. See e.g., Michael H. Schill, Deconcentrating the Inner City Poor, 67 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 795 (1991).
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demands for a better life, and the need for a vision in the phys-
ical setting of the metropolitan area, be met. The police power
enables society to uniformly regulate a wide variety of land-use
activities in order to protect the health, safety and general wel-
fare of the citizenry. The empirical experience denies drastic
revision or repeal of the land-use regulatory system as a realis-
tic option. Gotterdhmmerung on the operatic stage, yes; in real
life developments, no.
Going back to the same source of inspiration as has Justice
Antonin Scalia-the common law-I would like to emphasize
yet another aspect of this historic system: the continuous pro-
cess of working itself pure through experience, and the testing
of experience by logic and wisdom. "Changed circumstances or
new knowledge," as Justice Scalia himself explained, make
previous conclusions no longer applicable. 9
So three major expectations therefore exist to observe wheth-
er land-use developments flourish or founder:
1. Pragmatic adjustments of land-use controls, but within the
overwhelming Lockean tradition of the rights of property and a
tilt toward individual energy of development, even within an
expanding community action under the general welfare clause.
Inevitably, changes will continue in an evolutionary form, not
by a sharp turn in one direction or the other. The sanctity of
private property, and the right of the individual to deal as she
wills with the bundle of rights represented by "ownership," will
remain the staple tenet, tempered by a slightly more frequent
reference to a state or regional framework for common action.
State growth management plans may bring about more ambi-
tious overview of local government controls to attain balanced
growth and economic development objectives. The role of courts,
especially as they explore their own capacities and techniques
for implementation, in insisting on rationality, democratic polit-
ical processes, and instrumental nexii of ends and means, will
be both a check, through requiring due process of law on overly
arbitrary dispositions and regulations, and a spur to achieving
39. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992).
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constitutional mandates that may speed up the pace of evolu-
tion toward the equality pole.
2. The joint-venture society, with its more explicit recognition
of the roles of public and private sectors in land development,
may hasten the adaptation of traditional land-use controls dra-
matically, even to the point of changing the culture of land-use
planning, and being noted by later historians as a sharp break
in the evolutionary pattern. But this hinges on how popular
they become. One interesting variant: the prominence given by
the joint venture to costs and benefits means, in a world of
tightened budgets, the return of the struggle to mastering the
ancient puzzle of recapturing planning values. Demanding a
portion of the rewards from new synergies will be revisited in
many forms; even as there is no clearly articulated break with
the inherited ideology, the land-use system's more activist re-
sponse may provide a vivid example of Gould's punctuated
equilibria.
3. Finally, I turn to one steady state: the H. G. Wells view of
societal future depending on the outcome of the race between
catastrophe and education. The wisdom necessary for attaining
the good society may continue to elude us. But instilling greater
sophistication and awareness by the general public of the forces
that shape the physical (and related) patterns of existence is a
key task; the environmental programs, in many ways, as the
mirrors of growth management programs under the zoning
power, have been the major organizers of public awareness of
land interdependencies. °
Returning to the seminar's theme of the termination of land-
use controls, a possible twilight of the Gods, I recall one of
Mark Twain's acute observations. Asked how he liked the newly
arrived music of the revolutionary Richard Wagner (it might
have been Gotterddkmmerung), he replied only, "I hope it's better
than it sounds.". Whatever the final judgment on the Ring, this
assessment should be applied to the calls for drastic revisions
in our land-use system and for the adoption of extreme
deregulatory postures.
40. See, e.g., H. JEFFREY LEONARD, MANAGING OREGON'S GROWTH: THE POLITICS
OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING (1983).
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The joint-venture theme sheds a new perspective on the com-
munity plan, already so central to environmental and land-use
controls. It represents a move away from the world of isolated
individuals; its stress is on an organic and integrated whole. In
this sense, it undermines implanted liberal thought and the
traditional market approach, for it expresses the idea that a
free society, given all its divergent pulls, can enjoy periods of
commonality, and that by local democratic participation and
forethought (aided by technical experts), collective power can be
exerted to promote the well-being of the collectivity.
To return to Professor Wolfs question, the twilight is not yet
here. And the long period of stasis in land-use controls is not
about to be interrupted by abrupt change. The call for expand-
ed private property rights is especially simplistic. The task of
the next decades is not that of total recasting of the land-use
and environmental systems with an earlier halcyon form of
market ordering, but to improve and enhance the present
structure so that it continues the evolutionary pattern of meet-
ing the needs of continually evolving economic and social
arrangements.
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